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Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate the agency costs of government ownership and their 
impact on corporate governance and firm value.  China is used as a laboratory because 
of the prevalent state shareholdings in exchange-listed firms.  In this context, we 
specifically consider the trade-offs involved in the voluntary formation of an audit 
committee when the controlling shareholder is the state.  The decision to improve 
corporate governance (in this case, introduce an audit committee) is shown to be value 
relevant and a function of existing agency relationships and non-trivial implementation 
costs.  Our findings are robust to the level of pyramid groups, the ownership-control 
wedge, and financial leverage.  The research adds to the debate regarding the effect of 
government shareholdings on corporate culture and performance - a topic that has 
taken on renewed importance in recent times. 
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Introduction 
Since Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) discussion of the implicit and explicit contracts 
between owners and managers, research has improved our understanding of the 
agency costs relating to separation of ownership and control.  However, it is 
documented in a global context that the diffused shareholdings that underlie Jensen 
and Meckling’s (1976) theory are not the norm in most countries.  Instead, 
concentrated, pyramidal, and government ownership structures are far more 
common (La Porta, et al (1999), Claessens, et al (2002)).   This imposes another 
set of agency relationships on firms, particularly between the controlling 
shareholder (government or non-government) and minority shareholders. 
The influence of state ownership and its interaction with other corporate 
governance mechanisms is not well understood.  Theoretical debate on the reason 
for state ownership in listed corporations falls into one of three camps.  The first 
view is that governments invest when there has been some form of market failure 
(see Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980)), and state ownership has social benefits that the 
free market is unwilling to fund.  The part nationalization of the banking sector in 
2008 and 2009 by several governments lends strong credence to this hypothesis.   
Another view is that government-controlled organizations are simply vehicles 
for politically linked individuals to gain power or wealth as a reward for supporting 
the incumbent government party.  Government appointed executives may not 
have the requisite skills to run a large company and, collectively, a board consisting 
of several such individuals is likely to be inefficient.  state-owned organizations 
have been shown to have suboptimal investment policies and are undervalued by 
market participants (see Shleifer (1998)).    
The third perspective combines the first and second view by arguing that 
governments invest in firms out of a social need.  However, because of inefficient 
bureaucracy and indirect political agendas, managers have a tendency to become 
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entrenched and lack accountability (see Tirole (1994), Banerjee (1997), and Hart et 
al. (1997)). 
In this paper, we examine the effect of government ownership and control on 
corporate governance through the propensity of firms to improve their 
accountability to outside shareholders.  We focus on the voluntary formation of an 
audit committee since financial reporting quality is one of the main building blocks 
of good governance.  
In accounting research, arguments for improving transparency and 
accountability are based on reducing information asymmetry and mitigating the 
agency costs of the organizational form.  In general, stakeholders demand high 
quality reporting, which allows them to effectively and efficiently monitor the 
performance of management.  Controlling for the heterogeneous agency 
relationships that exist in today’s modern corporation, the main way to reduce the 
information gap between management and external stakeholders is through high 
quality financial disclosure.   
The optimal level of disclosure in a firm is determined by the trade-off 
between the outside demand for information and management’s private benefit 
associated with knowledge of the firm’s daily operations.  Moreover, this trade-off 
is implicitly influenced by the firm’s ownership and capital structure, as well as the 
costs of implementing new governance systems.   
In most firms, some form of monitoring or bonding mechanism may be 
introduced to limit the potential for wealth to be diverted from stakeholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  One approach is to voluntarily form an audit 
committee to improve the quality of financial disclosure.  Literature has shown 
that audit committees enhance managerial accountability and are an effective 
component of corporate governance (see, E.g., Wild (1994)). Since audit 
committees provide better quality assurance, their usefulness should increase in 
response to the level of agency problems within a firm. 
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Whereas in most developed markets, an audit committee is necessary for stock 
exchange listing, in China audit committees are optional.  By examining the 
determinants of audit committee formation and separately analyzing the impact of 
government control, we are able to disentangle the agency costs of state ownership 
and its effect on corporate value.  This is an important objective given the newly 
energized call for government ownership in major industries, such as the banking 
and automobile sectors. 
Our study makes four main contributions to the literature.  First, we consider 
the effect of government ownership on the agency relationships within a firm. We 
investigate how corporate governance is influenced by the presence of a dominant 
state shareholder and whether it complements or substitutes other governance 
mechanisms. In particular, we compare the agency costs of controlling ownership, 
where the dominant shareholder is the government or a private institution or 
family. 
Second, we complement the work of Fan and Wong (2005) by examining the 
role of the audit function in corporate governance.  Whereas Fan and Wong 
(2005) consider the role of an external auditor in closely held firms, we examine 
whether the formation of an audit committee, with its concomitant costs, mitigates 
the potentially severe agency costs in closely held firms and whether these differ 
between private and government-dominated ownership structures.  Such a direct 
study on the role of government ownership in corporate governance informs policy 
decisions on privatization and part-nationalization.    
Third, we develop an extension of the standard logit analysis to directly and 
intuitively illustrate the impact of corporate governance variables on managerial 
accountability.  We show that standard interpretations and comparisons of 
regression results are flawed without deriving the marginal effects of the estimated 
coefficients.  Through the non-linear characteristics of marginal effects, we 
concisely and intuitively show that voluntary audit committee formation is a 
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nonlinear function of the control rights of the dominant shareholder. Moreover, we 
adopt a model with interactive variables to investigate whether there are competing 
agency relationships in government and privately controlled corporations at 
different levels of share ownership. 
Finally, we contribute to the growing literature on emerging market corporate 
governance by studying China, the largest and most vibrant emerging economy in 
the world.  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) argue that the 
protection of shareholders and creditors by the legal system is central to 
understanding the patterns of corporate finance in different countries. The high 
levels of state ownership in listed firms are a special feature of Chinese financial 
markets and representative of most emerging economies. Understanding the effect 
of state shareholdings on corporate governance is crucial for investors and 
regulators in countries where state ownership is common or of increasing 
importance. 
The paper’s main testable propositions are theoretically founded on the two 
main sources of agency conflicts, as presented by Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan 
(2007).  Specifically, we consider the relationship between management and 
shareholders (Type I) and between controlling and non-controlling shareholders 
(Type II).  In widely held firms, Type I agency relationships are dominant whereas 
in closely held firms, the majority shareholder has significant capability to 
expropriate wealth from minority shareholders (Type II).   
Agency relationships in government controlled firms are very different from 
companies with a private controlling shareholder.  We propose different agency 
cost functions for private and government controlled firms.  In corporations with 
only private shareholders, the pressure to form an audit committee at high and low 
levels of ownership concentration is severe.  In government controlled firms, 
Type I agency costs are expected to be higher at all levels of ownership 
concentration due to inefficient compensation and governance structures, as well as 
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the contrasting objectives of the state as main shareholder. Given that no one 
individual can personally benefit from any rent seeking activities in government 
controlled firms, Type II agency costs will be less important.  Moreover, the Type 
II agency cost function of government owned firms is predicted to be invariant to 
controlling shareholder ownership levels. 
 Our core empirical analysis provides strong support for the theoretical 
propositions.  The probability of audit committee formation is higher at extreme 
levels (high and low) of private controlling ownership, in contrast to government 
controlled firms where it is shown to be invariant.  In addition, at moderate levels 
of controlling owner shareholdings, (between 25 and 40 percent), privately owned 
firms are less likely to have voluntarily formed audit committees.   
We further document that audit committees have value relevance.  Without 
an audit committee, the relative value (Tobin’s Q) of privately-controlled firms is 
significantly more than comparable government-controlled firms at shareholdings 
of between 25 and 40 percent.  Audit committees appear to mitigate the 
detrimental valuation effects of state shareholdings at all investment levels, since 
state-owned firms with audit committees have similar relative values to their 
privately controlled counterparts.   
Keeping the source of control (government or private) constant, audit 
committees complement other types of good corporate governance.  Audit 
committees are more likely to be found in companies that have split the role of 
chairman and chief executive, have more non-executive directors, more frequent 
board meetings, and larger boards. 
Overall, our results support the view that the agency costs of controlling 
ownership are very different in government controlled organizations.  Most 
research in corporate governance assumes that shareholder objectives are 
homogenous, and focused on maximizing shareholder wealth.  However, 
government objectives are very different and this has a crucial impact on the way 
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managers behave.  The research contributes valuable insights to the debate on 
strategic state support and the part nationalization of financially distressed 
corporations, a topic that has had increasing relevance in recent times.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 1 develops our central 
hypotheses. Section 2 describes the Chinese institutional environment.  Section 3 
presents details of the sample and research design, and Section 4 reports our main 
results and presents some robustness checks.  Section 5 offers some conclusions. 
1. Hypotheses Development 
Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan (2007) propose two main agency relationships within 
exchange-listed corporations.  A Type I agency relationship concerns shareholders 
and management whereas a Type II agency relationship involves majority and 
minority shareholders.  In each case, conflicts between the two parties lead to 
costs that reduce the value of the firm.  However, in corporations with some form 
of state ownership, these relationships have a different nature because of the 
politically motivated objectives of management and government.  In the following 
sections we discuss how they differ between firms with private and government 
shareholders.  
 
1.1 Conflicts between managers and shareholders   
 
There are several reasons why managers in state-owned firms may be less 
motivated to maximize shareholder wealth.  A government shareholder has other 
objectives not necessarily driven by a value-maximization paradigm.  For example, 
political agendas will be an important driver of managerial behavior, whether they 
relate to a capping of profits, a targeted investment strategy or positive employment 
practices.  In addition, government shareholders are unlikely to have a specialized 
knowledge of a firm’s operations, allowing managers some scope in pursuing their 
personal objectives.  Executive turnover and bonuses also tend to be less in firms 
with state shareholdings (see, for example, Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996; and 
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Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001).  Collectively, these characteristics can impose a 
significant cost to corporations with any form of state ownership. 
While the negative effect of state ownership has been well documented, there are 
some positive aspects.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that where the manager 
has less than a controlling interest in a firm, the agency costs associated with 
managerial entrenchment will also depend upon the external labor market. 
Competition from other potential managers limits the costs of obtaining managerial 
services. For state-controlled enterprises, the senior management is often appointed 
through a political process and the external labor market is largely non-existent.  
Although the potential for managerial entrenchment is high, the relationship 
between managers and government shareholders will naturally have a longer-term 
focus, and this will mitigate the myopic behavior of management.  
 
1.2 Conflicts between controlling and non-controlling 
shareholders   
 
In firms with a concentrated ownership structure, controlling shareholders have the 
power to ensure that managers pursue objectives at the cost of minority 
shareholders. For example, controlling shareholders may vote sympathetic directors 
on to the board or make their company engage in related party transactions.  
Research has shown that agency costs resulting from controlling shareholders can 
be significant (see, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
When the controlling shareholder is the state, the conflict is effectively that of 
the government’s objective of social welfare maximization against the firm’s 
objective of profit maximization.  Bös (1991) shows that these two objectives are 
complementary in a perfectly competitive environment.  However, when the 
environment is not perfectly competitive, the government has an incentive to 
monitor managers and act as an internal regulator.  In sum, unlike privately 
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controlled firms, it is not in the government’s interests to exploit the inherent 
weaknesses of non-controlling shareholders.   
 
1.3 Demand for External and Internal Monitoring  
 
Given the different agency cost functions of private and government controlled 
firms, it is natural that their demand functions for external and internal monitoring 
will also be different. The introduction of any governance system incurs a finite 
cost and firms will adopt a new governance structure (e.g. voluntary audit 
formation, appointment of non-executive directors, etc.) only if the benefits 
outweigh the costs.  Since the costs of implementation are likely to be fixed, any 
observed variation in corporate governance systems across firms will be related to 
the benefits associated with each structure and the extent to which they mitigate 
Type I and Type II agency costs.  The main implication is that firms with better 
corporate governance will be those where monitoring is most required and Type I 
and Type II agency costs are at their most severe. 
Figure 1a presents the Type I and Type II agency costs in privately controlled 
firms as a function of the cash flow rights of the controlling owner.  At low levels 
of controlling ownership, where the separation of ownership and control is 
significant, Type I agency costs dominate.  Managers have little incentive to 
pursue shareholder objectives and, as a result, there is a need for stronger corporate 
governance.  When a firm is closely held, Type II agency costs are significantly 
more important and the desire to improve accountability and reduce the probability 
of rent-seeking behavior by controlling owners will be strong. 
New corporate governance structures will only be introduced when their 
benefit is greater than the cost of implementation and this is represented in Figure 
1a by the shaded region at both extremes of the graph.  This leads to proposition 
1. 
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Proposition 1:  When a firm has a private controlling shareholder, stronger corporate governance 
will be observed in widely and closely held firms. 
 
Figure 1b presents a similar function for firms where the government is the 
controlling shareholder.  The figure has the same scale as in Figure 1a.  In 
government controlled firms, Type I agency costs always dominate.  This is 
because managerial entrenchment is a problem at all levels of government 
shareholdings.  In widely held firms, government and privately controlled firms 
have similar Type I agency costs.  However, whereas they decrease in privately 
controlled firms as controlling ownership grows, in government controlled firms 
they stay constant.   Type II agency relationships are not important in 
government controlled firms because the state has no need to expropriate wealth 
from minority shareholders.  Governments can use other methods to more 
efficiently extract wealth from firms and shareholders, most notably through the 
tax system.  
As can be seen in Figure 1b, the level of corporate governance in government-
controlled firms will be invariant to the level of controlling ownership.  This leads 
to proposition 2. 
Proposition 2:  When a firm has a government controlling shareholder, the strength of corporate 
governance will be invariant to the level of controlling ownership. 
 
1.4 Value Relevance of Corporate Governance  
 
Propositions 1 and 2 provide insights into the valuation effects of corporate 
governance.  If corporate governance innovations are introduced to mitigate the 
effect of Type I and Type II agency costs, firms with better corporate governance 
will have a higher value than comparable firms with similar agency costs but with 
weak corporate governance.  This is because any new governance system will only 
be introduced when the benefits are greater than the costs of implementation. 
 
Proposition 3:  Firms with stronger corporate governance will have higher value than comparable 
firms with similar agency costs but with weak corporate governance. 
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Whereas proposition 3 relates to the valuation effects of corporate governance 
across similar types of firms (privately owned or government owned), it says 
nothing about the valuation effects of corporate governance across different levels 
of controlling shareholdings within the same firm.  For any level of controlling 
ownership, the observed value of a firm (ignoring the effect of corporate 
governance) will be equal to  
 
  Obs True Type I Type IIV V C C= − −     (1) 
 
Where VTrue is the value of the firm without any agency costs, and CType I and 
CType II are the Type I and Type II agency costs, respectively.   Note that the 
probability of introducing new corporate governance structures is not related to the 
maximization of firm value, but instead is a function of the level of extreme values 
of individual Type I and Type II agency costs.  Moreover, while the reason for 
introducing corporate governance will be related to either one of Type I or Type II 
agency costs, its effect will mitigate both costs.  This leads us to Equation 2, 
which presents the observed value of a firm with corporate governance. 
 
Obs True CGV V C= −        (2) 
 
where CCG is the cost of introducing Corporate Governance.  Thus, the 
variation in the value of a firm as ownership concentration increases is totally 
dependent on the combination of Type I and II agency costs and the costs of 
implementing better corporate governance. In any rational equilibrium, new 
corporate governance systems will be introduced as soon as it is beneficial to do so 
and this will occur when CCG is less than CType I or CType II. 
In privately owned firms, CCG is less than CType I and CType II when ownership 
concentration is very low and very high, respectively.  At moderate controlling 
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shareholdings, CType I and CType II are individually no greater than CCG and stronger 
corporate governance is not required.  However, the combined agency costs, CType I 
and CType II, will likely be higher than the implementation costs of new governance 
systems.  Taking these factors together, the value of privately owned firms will be 
less at moderate controlling shareholdings than at the extreme. 
As Figure 1b shows, the Type I agency costs in government controlled firms 
are invariant to shareholder concentration and will always be greater than the costs 
of introducing new corporate governance.  It is thus optimal for government 
controlled firms to have enhanced monitoring at all levels of government 
shareholdings and, as a result, the value of government controlled firms will be 
equal to Equation 2, irrespective of shareholder concentration. 
 
Proposition 4a:  Without corporate governance, the value of privately controlled firms will be a 
function of the Type I and Type II agency costs, which vary with shareholder concentration. 
 
Proposition 4b:  Without corporate governance, the value of government controlled firms will be 
invariant to shareholder concentration.   
 
Proposition 5a:  With corporate governance, the value of privately controlled firms will be less at 
moderate levels of shareholder concentration.      
 
Proposition 5b:  With corporate governance, the value of government controlled firms will be 
invariant to shareholder concentration. 
 
In our empirical tests, we consider voluntary audit committees in Chinese 
firms and use them as a proxy for improved corporate governance.  Clearly, the 
presence of other governance systems or structures could also be considered, since 
there is a plethora of innovations a firm can make with respect to improving 
corporate governance. However, the audit function is directly related to improving 
transparency and disclosure in a firm and is most likely to be associated with 
information quality and value – significantly more so than governance changes 
relating to board structure.  
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2. The Chinese Institutional Environment 
In 2008, China marked its thirtieth anniversary of economic reforms.  An 
important component of the change in Chinese economic development was the 
1990 establishment of two stock exchanges, Shanghai and Shenzhen, which 
brought capital markets to the forefront of economic development in the country.  
The initial motivation for vibrant stock exchanges was to facilitate reform in 
state owned enterprises and to foster a more effective corporate management 
system through the development of a competitive capital market.  Given this 
history, share ownership in China has unique characteristics.  A familiarization of 
the ownership structure of publicly listed Chinese corporations is key to 
understanding corporate governance practice in China. 
Common stock in Chinese firms can be classified as state-held shares, legal-
person shares, and tradable shares.   Each category accounts for approximately 
one-third of the total shares issued (Xu and Wang, 1999).  All Shares carry the 
same voting and cash flow rights and government owned shares are held by public 
agencies such as the Bureau of state Assets Management.  Legal-person shares can 
be held by state owned enterprises (SOEs), collectively owned enterprises, 
township and village enterprises, domestic private companies, and foreign 
investors.  Both state-held and legal-person shares cannot be traded in the 
secondary market and can only be transferred between domestic institutions subject 
to approval from the Ministry of Finance and the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) 1 .  Tradable shares are freely transferable in the two 
secondary markets.   
High state ownership is often regarded as the main reason for ineffective 
corporate governance in China. Prior research has investigated the relationship 
between state ownership and firm performance in the country and the main finding 
                                                     
1 In 2005, a new policy was introduced to change the status of non-tradable state and non-state shares 
into tradable A-shares. Over time all shares will be tradable and potentially transferred to foreign and 
domestic private sector investors.  
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is that performance is negatively related to the level of direct state ownership (Xu 
and Wang, 1999; Qi et al. 2000; Hovey et al. 2003). 
In order to improve the quality of listed companies and establish a modern 
corporate governance culture in China, the Chinese Security Regulation 
Commission (CSRC) and the National Economic and Trade Commission (NETC) 
have issued a number of regulations and guidelines on corporate governance.  The 
most important document is the “Code for Corporate Governance of Listed 
Companies” issued by the CSRC and the NETC in January 2002.  The Code 
covers key issues in corporate governance such as the board of directors, 
shareholder rights, the role of the controlling shareholder, the supervisory board, 
management incentives, related party transactions, and information disclosure2.    
In order to improve supervision and to assist decision making in the key 
functions of the board, the Code recommends the voluntary formation of 
committees for strategy, audit, remuneration, and nomination.  Enhancing 
financial reporting quality and transparency is seen as the main route to improving 
the protection of minority shareholders.  Whilst there is considerable evidence 
documenting the effectiveness of audit committees in developed economies, there 
is very little work on the determinants and their effectiveness in developing 
markets, such as China, especially in the context of high government ownership. 
3. Sample and Research Design 
This section describes the selection criteria and resultant sample of companies.  It 
also presents the data construction process, key sample statistics, and the 
methodology used for our empirical tests. 
                                                     
2 The Chinese corporate governance system consists of both a board of directors and supervisory 
board.  However, the two boards are parallel to each other, more similar in structure to Japan than 
the continental European two-tier system that exists in Germany and The Netherlands.  The 
nominations of both boards are proposed through the annual shareholders’ meeting.  The 
effectiveness of the supervisory board tends to be very limited in practice.  As regulatory emphasis 
has focused on the role of independent directors in monitoring, it has been that the supervisory 
board be removed from the code of practice or made voluntary (China Corporate Governance 
Report, SHSE, 2003).   
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3.1 Sample 
 
The initial sample consists of all listed Chinese firms for the period 2002 to 2004.  
In January 2002, Chinese regulators recommended the voluntary formation of audit 
committees.  In addition, data requirements also necessitated a 2002 start date 
since information on ultimate controlling shareholders was only disclosed from 
financial years beginning in 2001.  
Table 1 presents a detailed breakdown of the final sample, which necessitated a 
number of filters to ensure data consistency.  First, firms with cross-listed shares 
and financial firms were excluded because they are subject to more stringent 
regulatory governance requirements.  Second, we omit firms that are traded on the 
Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) Board.  The SME Board was introduced by 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2004 and requires significantly less regulation the 
main exchange.  Third, we drop any firm where information on the ultimate 
controlling shareholder is not available3.  Finally, companies without sufficient 
data are also dropped from the analysis.  This sampling procedure resulted in a 
final sample of 3,217 firm years.  The distribution of firms across years is stable 
and the proportion of firms dropped according to each filter rule remained fairly 
constant throughout the time period under study. 
 
3.2 Measurements and Data 
 
The Audit Committee formation data is manually abstracted from the “Corporate 
Governance” or “Board Report” section in corporate annual reports.   The 
annual reports of listed companies are downloaded from the CSRC designated 
information disclosure website - Giant Tidal Information Network.4   
                                                     
3  Some companies did not disclose the proportion of shares in the pyramidal chain.  Missing 
information in any chains leads to great difficulty in measuring the separation of control and cash 
flow rights. 
4  http://www.cninfo.com.cn 
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The concept of “ultimate control” is introduced by La Porta et al. (1999) who 
study investor protection and ownership structure in a global context. This has 
been further developed within an agency cost framework by Claessens et al., 2002; 
Faccio and Lang, 2002; Lemmon & Lins, 2003; and Fan & Wong, 2002, 2005. 
The length of the ultimate controlling shareholder’s pyramid chain is used as a 
proxy measure for agency costs between the ultimate controlling shareholder and 
the management team.  We follow La porta et al.’s (1999) method in constructing 
these two variables.  However, a major difference in our measure is that both 
listed and non-listed firms are used to identify the length of pyramidal chains.  
Information on the ultimate controlling shareholder is manually extracted from 
each firm’s annual reports.  Agency chains are measured by the number of layers 
between the ultimate controller and the listed company. If there are many chains of 
control, the shortest is taken as the pyramidal chain length. 
The type of ultimate controlling shareholder is identified as follows: (1) If the 
ultimate controlling shareholder is a natural person, private enterprise, Employee 
Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP), collective enterprise, township government 
department, or foreign-funded enterprise, it is categorized as a non-state or 
privately held firm. (2) If the ultimate controlling shareholder is a central 
government agency, local government institution, or state university, it is regarded 
as a state-controlled firm.  
Board structure and corporate finance variables are drawn from the CSMAR 
corporate governance and financial reporting database.  If missing data is 
encountered, the financial accounts are manually examined to supplement the 
information in the sample.  Variable definitions are summarized in Table 2.   
Table 3 reports audit committee formation by ownership type and year.  It is 
clear that audit committees became more prevalent as the sample period 
progressed.  Given that the first year of the sample coincided with the start of 
governance reforms in China, it is to be expected that most firms would not have 
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introduced audit committees in 2002.  state-owned firms were more responsive to 
the recommendations of governance reforms and by the end of the sample period, 
more state-owned firms had audit committees than did not.  This is in contrast to 
privately owned firms, where the opposite is the case. 
 
3.3 Sample statistics 
 
We report the distribution of ultimate control by ownership type in Table 4.  
Share ownership of Chinese firms is highly concentrated.  Ninety-nine percent of 
corporations have a controlling shareholder at the 10 percent cut-off level of 
control rights.  When the cut-off point is between 20 and 40 percent, naturally 
more corporations are classified as widely-held.  However, the percentages are still 
very high at the 20 percent threshold.  Even for the 40 percent threshold, more 
than 50 percent of companies are controlled by a single ultimate owner.   
Compared with Claessens et al (2002), Chinese firms have a similar level of 
ownership concentration to firms in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Singapore and 
Thailand when the 10 and 20 percent threshold is applied.  For the 40 percent 
ownership threshold, China has the highest concentration level.  Moreover, the 
state ultimately controls around half of all listed companies in China’s stock 
markets when the 40 percent control right threshold is used.   
Descriptive statistics of the variables are reported in Table 5. The 
characteristics of state-owned and privately-controlled firms are economically very 
similar with government firms tending to be larger in size and having lower Q 
ratios.  The debt-to-asset ratios are also similar at approximately fifty percent for 
both firm ownership categories. 
Salient differences relate to ownership and control.  Government firms have 
more concentrated ownership and control than their private counterparts, with 
control and cash flow rights of 47.12 percent and 42.59 percent compared to 36.10 
percent and 21.11 percent, respectively.  The ownership-control wedge in Chinese 
firms is highly variable, particularly in privately-owned firms, which have an average 
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voting-cash flow rights ratio of 3.23 with a standard deviation of 5.50.  This 
compares with government controlled firms, where the mean voting-cash flow 
rights ratio is 1.34 with a standard deviation of 1.55.  The length of pyramid 
chains is similar at approximately two companies.  
An interesting difference between Chinese firms and companies in developed 
countries is the use of the big four auditing firms.  In China, this figure is 
exceptionally low and only about five percent of firms in our sample employ the 
big four auditors.  Instead, local Chinese auditors are given the task of auditing 
firms.  Board structures in privately-owned and state-owned firms are very similar.  
The average board consists of approximately ten members with a mean of three 
independent directors.  Only ten percent of firms combine the role of Chairman 
and CEO and, on average, boards meet eight times a year.   
 
3.4 Empirical Research Design 
 
3.4.1 Audit Committee Formation 
 
To investigate the determinants of audit committee formation, we use a logit 
regression analysis.  In this section, we first discuss the specification of the model 
and then review methods for interpreting and presenting the logit regression 
results, especially when the relationship between variables is nonlinear.  The 
following general model is used. 
 
( 1 | ) ( ) exp( ) / [1 exp( )]P y G= = ≡ +x xβ xβ xβ     (3)  
 
where y = 1 when an audit committee exists and y = 0 otherwise; x is a vector of 
explanatory variables and β is a vector of coefficients to be estimated.  
( ) exp( ) / [1 exp( )]G ≡ +xβ xβ xβ is the logistic mapping function that maps 
the xβ matrix onto the response probability P(y = 1|x).  The specification of x is 
as follows: 
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x  ={gov, gov_c, gov_csq, gov_vc, gov_pyramid, gov_debt, gov_dirs, gov_dirssq, C, 
Csq, VC, Pyramid, Debt, DirS, DirSsq, Big4, BordSize, BoardInd, Combine, 
NumBoardMeet, TotAsset, FixAssToTass, year03, year04} 
Definitions of the variables are given in Table 2.  We specify the empirical 
model with the following considerations.  First, in order to study the effect of 
state ownership, we create a set of interactive variables to incorporate cross-group 
variance.  This is better than studying subsamples of the data, which is only valid 
when the two sample error vectors are independent.  Variables with a prefix of 
‘gov_’ are interactive variables constructed by multiplying the ‘gov’ variable with a 
target variable.  The interactive variables are directly related to our hypotheses, in 
that there will be differences between state and non-state controlled firms.   
Second, in studying the effect of voting and cash flow rights of the ultimate 
controlling shareholder, previous literature often includes both cash flow and 
voting rights in the same equation.  However, this creates a potential 
multicollinearity problem in the estimation. For example, cash flow and voting 
rights have a correlation coefficient of 0.81 in our sample.  Multicollinearity 
inflates standard errors making empirical results sensitive to small changes in 
sample construction or model specification.   
We therefore use only one of the variables in our equation to measure the level 
of ownership, while having the other variable capture the degree of separation in 
voting and cash flow rights.  Since {C, V-C} is a linear combination of {C, V}, we 
use the ratio of the two variables and an indicative dummy variable to differentiate 
between high and low (zero) degrees of separation.  Alternative specifications are 
considered in robustness checks and are discussed in section 4.3.  
Finally, we include control variables for size, asset utilization, and sample 
period.  Pooled regression results are reported. We also perform the analysis for 
each individual year, which produces similar evidence to that reported here.   
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3.4.2 Marginal Effects and Standard Errors of Logit 
Regressions 
 
Apart from their signs, it is not a simple task to directly interpret the coefficients of 
logit models.  One way, which also facilitates comparisons across models, is to 
consider the partial derivative of the probability that y equals one with respect to a 
continuous explanatory variable, xi.  This gives the marginal effect of xi on P(y = 
1)|x).  The formula is as follows: 
2
( ) exp( )( )
[1 exp( )]i ii
G
g
x
β β∂ = ≡
∂ +
xβ xβ
xβ
xβ
     (4)  
The effect of a change in xi depends on the other variables in x through g(xβ).  
As in the standard logit model, 
2
exp( )( )
[1 exp( )]
g ≡
+
xβ
xβ
xβ
 is always greater than 
zero, and the sign of the effect of a change in xi corresponds to the sign of its 
coefficient, βi.  The relative effects of two independent variables, xi and xj, do not 
depend on x since 
( ) /
/
( ) /
i
i j
j
G x
G x
β β∂ ∂ =
∂ ∂
xβ
xβ
.  Therefore, the beta coefficient is 
meaningful in relative comparisons. 
If the functional form has a nonlinear term, equation 3 can be rewritten as 
follows: 
2
0 1,1 1 1,2 1( 1 | ) ( ) ( ... )k kP y G G x x xβ β β β= = ≡ + + + +x xβ   (5) 
The partial effect of x1 on P(y = 1) can then be evaluated as 
 1,1 1,2 1 1,1 1,2 12
1
( ) exp( )( )( 2 ) ( 2 )
[1 exp( )]
G
g x x
x
β β β β∂ = + ≡ +
∂ +
xβ xβ
xβ
xβ
 (6) 
In this case, Equation (6) shows that the partial effect of x1 on P(y = 1) will also 
depend on the level of x1.  It thus follows that there will be a U shape in the 
response probability, with a turning point at x1 = -β1/2β2.   
In order to evaluate equations (4) and (6), the level of x is required to estimate 
the value of g(xβ).  The natural choice for this value is the sample mean, which is 
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often used in programmes, such as STATA.  However, adjustments need to be 
made when there are dummy variables and interactions in the regression equation.  
In the context of the current research, we use dummy variables to separate the 
effect of state vs non-state control firms.  Instead of taking the mean of the 
dummy variable, we evaluate the equation separately since the dummy variable is 
equal to 1 and 0.  
For the nonlinear effect in equation (6), we estimate the marginal effect of x1 
for different levels of x1, holding all other variables at their means.  Since the x1 
vector measures ownership, we evaluate the effect at every 5 percent interval range 
between 0 to 100 percent.  The standard errors of the marginal effects in 
equations (4) and (6) are obtained using the delta method (See Wooldridge, 2003 : 
Chapter 15). 
In summarizing our empirical tests, we graphically present the effect of 
changes in x1 on the predicted probability of audit committee formation, the 
marginal effects and their confidence intervals. 
Finally, to test whether there is a difference in agency costs between state and 
non-state controlled companies, we construct the predicted probability of audit 
committee formation for these two types of company and test for a statistical 
difference.  This is equivalent to testing the significance of the marginal effect of 
the dummy variable ‘gov’.  The measure is constructed as follows. 
 1, 0,_ ( 1 | ) ( 1 | )c gov c gov cDiff gov P y P y= == = − =x x    (7) 
Where 1,gov c=x is a vector of the sample means when gov is set to be 1, the 
interactive terms (gov_vc, gov_pyramid, gov_debt, gov_dirs) are constructed using the 
sample means of the original variable, (c, csq, vc, pyramid, debt, dirs) are incremented 
from 5 percent to 100 percent, and (gov_c, gov_csq) and 0,gov c=x  is a vector of the 
sample means with the gov and other interactive variables set to zero.  The 
standard error of this measure is obtained using the delta method.  
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3.4.3 Value Relevance analysis 
 
In studying the valuation effects of audit committees, we adopt a variant of the 
Tobin’s Q measure to capture firm value.  The following empirical specification is 
used to test our empirical hypotheses. 
Q = xβ         (8) 
where Q is the sum of the market value of equity and book value of debt divided by 
the book value of total assets, and x is the vector of explanatory variables.  The 
specification of x is as follows. 
x  ={gov, gov_c, gov_csq, gov_vc, gov_pyramid, gov_debt, gov_dirs, C, Csq, VC, 
Pyramid, Debt, DirS, Big4, BordSize, BoardInd, Combine, NumBoardMeet, 
TotInvestment, TotAsset, year03, year04, pri_pd_ac, gov_pd_ac, industry_dummy} 
Definitions of the variables are given in Table 2.  We specify the empirical 
model with the following considerations.  First, we control for the effect of 
investment on firm value by introducing total long-term investment as an 
explanatory variable.  Second, in order to study the value relevance of audit 
committees we include an audit committee dummy variable for both private and 
government controlled firms.  To control for endogeneity in the relationship 
between audit committee formation and firm value, we carry out a simultaneous 
equations analysis using two-stage least squares.  The probability of audit 
committee formation is estimated using equation (3) and the predicted value of the 
audit committee variable for each firm is included in the second stage regression 
(the Q equation). 
After estimating model (8), we then investigate how firm value varies with the 
level of controlling ownership by predicting Q with all explanatory variables held at 
their means and varying the level of cash flow right, (c, csq).  The value relevance 
of audit committees is estimated by calculating the predicted Q, setting pri_pd_ac 
and gov_pd_ac to zero, and comparing them to the predicted Q when pri_pd_ac and 
gov_pd_ac are set at their predicted level.   
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4. Empirical Results 
This section reports the empirical results and discusses their implications.  The 
results for audit committee formation and its value relevance are presented in the 
following two subsections.  These are followed by discussions of our robustness 
checks. 
4.1 Agency costs and the demand for audit committees  
 
We examine propositions 1 and 2 through our logit model estimation and post-
estimation tests.  Although the original coefficients are presented in Table 6, we 
focus most of our discussion around the marginal effect of each variable.  Table 6 
reports the maximum likelihood estimation results for equation (3).  The p-value 
column shows that many coefficients are statistically significant, with an overall 
Pseudo R2 of 6 percent.   
The marginal effects and standard errors of the controlling ownership 
variables are summarized in Figure 2 respectively.  Since the relationship between 
cash flow rights and audit committee formation is nonlinear, marginal effects allow 
us to correctly measure the impact of each unit change in cash flow rights on the 
predicted probability of audit committee formation, conditional on the existing 
level of cash flow rights.   
Our results provide strong support for propositions 1 and 2.  Figure 2a 
shows that, for private firms, the marginal effect of controlling ownership on the 
probability of audit committee formation falls and then increases.  In contrast, the 
probability of audit committee formation is invariant to controlling cash flow rights 
in government firms (Figure 2b).  While the trend in marginal effects differ across 
ownership levels, they are insignificantly different from zero at the 10 percent level. 
In Figure 3, we compare the predicted probability of audit committee 
formation between private and government controlled firms.  Holding everything 
else constant, government controlled firms are significantly more likely to form an 
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audit committee when their holdings are between 25 and 45 percent, and they are 
significantly less likely than private firms to form an audit committee when their 
holding is greater than 80 percent.  This is again consistent with proposition 1 and 
2. 
The marginal effects and standard errors of the linear explanatory variables are 
summarized in Table 7.  The results show that the only variable which influences 
the probability of audit committee formation is the cash flow/voting rights wedge.  
The larger the ownership-control wedge, the greater the demand for an audit 
committee.  This is especially true for government controlled firms.  
Furthermore, keeping the source of control (government or private) constant, 
Table 7 shows that larger, active, and more independent boards are likely to 
establish audit committees.  In addition, where the CEO and Chairman roles are 
combined there is a greater need to have an audit committee to control for 
reporting quality.  This suggests that audit committees complement other forms 
of good corporate governance. 
 
4.2 Value relevance of audit committees  
 
Table 8 reports the 2SLS regression results for the value relevance equation (8).  
The coefficients of interest are pri_pd_ac and gov_pd_ac, and both are positive with 
only gov_pd_ac statistically significant.  These results suggest that audit committees 
enhance the value of government-controlled firms but not for companies with a 
non-state controlling owner. 
The valuation effects of audit committees are further illustrated in Figures 4 
and 5.   Figure 4 presents the predicted Q for private and government controlled 
firms with different levels of cash flow rights, without taking the effect of audit 
committees into consideration.  The predicted Qs are calculated using the 
estimation results reported in Table 8, holding all variables at their mean level and 
setting the predicted audit committee dummy for private (pri_pd_ac) and state 
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controlled (gov_pd_ac) firms to zero.  Interactive dummy variables involving the 
private and government indicator variables are changed accordingly.    
Figure 4 should be compared to Figure 5, where the predicted Q ratios for 
private and government controlled firms are calculated with the same empirical 
specification, except that the predicted audit committee dummy for private 
(pri_pd_ac) and state controlled (gov_pd_ac) firms is now equal to one.  Both figures 
present the Q ratio – cash flow rights relationship, conditional on the existence 
(Figure 5) or non-existence (Figure 4) of an audit committee in the firm. 
The results in Figures 4 and 5 show that audit committees improve the 
performance of firms that have state controlling shareholders.  Ignoring the 
impact of audit committees, for controlling shareholdings of between 25 and 45 
percent, the performance of state-owned firms is significantly lower than their 
privately-held counterparts.  This difference disappears once the effect of audit 
committees is introduced. 
Our results strongly support propositions 3, 4, and 5, regarding the value 
relevance of audit committees.  Moreover, they demonstrate the differential effect 
of audit committees in private and government controlled firms.  Specifically, 
audit committees appear to mitigate the inferior market valuations of state 
shareholdings at all investment levels. 
There are a number of additional insights from Table 8.  First, a high level of 
separation in voting and cash flow rights has a negative impact on firm value in 
general.  Both vc and the recovered gov_vc coefficient are negative, with the 
recovered gov_vc coefficient significant at the 10 percent level. 
Second, the length of pyramidal chain has different effects in privately 
controlled firms compared to government controlled firms.  The longer the 
pyramidal chain, the lower the firm value for privately controlled firms although 
the coefficient is not significant.  In contrast, the longer the pyramidal chain, the 
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higher the firm value for government controlled firms.  The difference between 
the two ownership categories is statistically significant.  
Fan, Wong and Zhang (2005) argue that the main incentive for the state to use 
corporate pyramids in executing their control rights is the incentive to decentralize 
power.  Additional layers in the control chain are associated with higher 
bureaucratic costs should the government intervene in corporate decision making.  
Our results support the Fan et al. (2005) findings and suggest that pyramidal 
ownership structures are used by the state to decentralize decision making and 
increase firm value. 
 
4.3 Robustness Tests 
 
The pooled regressions with year dummies show, not surprisingly, that the 
prevalence of audit committees across Chinese firms is increasing over time.  We 
also perform a sub-sample analysis for each year and the results are consistent with 
our findings for the full sample, although the effect of the explanatory variables is 
less significant in general for the sub-sample analysis. 
We also apply alternative specifications of the regression equations by 
replacing cash flow rights with voting rights as a measure of controlling ownership.  
The results are very similar to what have been reported in the main results section.  
The only difference is that the turning point of the nonlinear effect for voting 
rights is about 5 percent higher than that of cash flow rights.  This is to be 
expected, since, for a given firm, the ultimate controlling shareholder’s voting rights 
would be greater or equal to their cash flow rights. 
We also examine the robustness of our results to alternative measures of 
separation in voting and cash flow rights.  The overall results are the same. 
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5. Conclusions 
We study the importance of agency issues in the context of government ownership 
using a sample of voluntary audit committee formations in China.  Agency 
considerations are different when the controlling shareholder is the government or 
a private institution or individual, and this is primarily due to the fundamentally 
different objectives of the two investor groups.  Whereas private shareholders are 
characterized by personal wealth maximization behavior, government investors 
consider wider, non-pecuniary targets that are flavored by political considerations.  
The dichotomies of agendas critically affect management behavior and the 
perception of outside investors regarding the firm.  Corporate governance 
intersects these issues and mitigates the valuation effect of the differing objectives.  
We document that the ownership structure in Chinese listed companies is 
highly concentrated and the identity of the ultimate controlling shareholder is an 
important determinant of agency costs.  Agency costs are higher in state-
controlled firms than in privately-controlled firms, primarily because of the 
potentially severe lack of convergence in objectives between management and the 
owner.  
In privately-controlled firms, the fundamental agency problem is not the 
conflict between outside investors and managers, but rather that between minority 
and controlling shareholders.  We find that the agency cost arising from the 
relationship between the ultimate largest shareholder and minority shareholders is 
one of the key determinants in the voluntary introduction of audit committees.  
As the cash flow and voting rights become concentrated in one individual, the 
pressure to form an audit committee in privately-controlled firms grows 
significantly.  However, in government-controlled firms, the pattern is very 
different.  At moderate levels of state shareholdings, (between 25 and 40 percent), 
the need for enhanced financial disclosure and an audit committee is significantly 
higher than in private firms.  When the government owns more than 80 percent 
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of an exchange-listed company’s shares, audit committees become less prevalent.  
This is strongly indicative of the countervailing agency costs of governmental 
holdings at different levels of state ownership.     
Audit committees have value relevance for firms with moderate government 
stakes.  Without an audit committee, the relative value (Tobin’s Q) of 
government-controlled firms is significantly less than comparable privately-
controlled firms at shareholdings of between 25 and 40 percent.  Audit 
committees appear to mitigate the detrimental effects of state shareholdings at 
these investment levels since state-owned firms with audit committees have similar 
relative values to their privately controlled counterparts. 
We also document that the use of pyramidal chains has a different effect on 
the value of private and government controlling firms.  Firm performance is 
worse the longer the pyramidal chain between an ultimate private controlling 
shareholder and the company.  On the other hand, consistent with Fan et al. 
(2005), when the controlling shareholder is the government, pyramidal chains have 
a positive effect on firm performance.  
Keeping the source of control (government or private) constant, audit 
committees complement other types of good corporate governance.  Audit 
committees are more likely to be found in companies that have split the role of 
chairman and chief executive, have more non-executive directors, more frequent 
board meetings and larger boards. 
Overall, our results support the view that the agency costs of controlling 
ownership are very different in government-controlled organizations.  Although 
such firms require increased monitoring when the government holds moderate 
stakes, the benefits of state shareholdings provide other non-pecuniary benefits.  
With respect to the current study, the agency relationship between controlling 
government shareholders and minority shareholders is not as severe as in privately 
controlled firms at ownership concentration levels.  This is possibly because the 
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ability to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders is significantly reduced 
when the controlling shareholder is the state.  
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Table 1 Sample Selection Process 
This table presents a detailed breakdown of the final sample by year. 
 2002 2003 2004 Total 
Total number of listed firms at the end of the year 1224 1287 1377 3888 
Companies with dual class B or H shares 139 140 142 421 
Financial Firms 9 10 10 29 
Companies on SME board. 0 0 39 39 
Ownership information is not available 56 37 30 123 
Companies with insufficient data 10 19 30 59 
Final sample 1010 1081 1126 3217 
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Table 2 Variable Definitions 
This table summarizes the definitions of variables used in the analysis.  
Variable Definition 
AC A dummy variable that is equal to 1 when an audit committee exists 
during the reporting year and 0 otherwise. 
Q Tobin’s Q measure calculated as (market value of equity + book value 
of debt)/ total assets. 
Gov A dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the ultimate largest shareholder 
of the company is the state and 0 otherwise. 
V Proportion of voting rights of the largest shareholder 
C Proportion of cash flow rights of the largest shareholder 
V_C Voting rights less cash flow rights 
VC Voting rights divided by cash flow rights 
Pyramid Length of pyramidal chain 
Debt Total debt over total assets 
DirS Percentage director shareholdings 
Big4 A dummy variable that is equal to 1 when the company’s auditor is 
one of the big 4 accountancy firms and 0 otherwise. 
BordSize The total number of directors on the board. 
BoardInd The percentage of independent directors on the board. 
Combine A dummy variable that is equal to 1 when the Role of CEO and 
Chairman is combined and 0 otherwise. 
NumBoardMeet The number of board meetings in a year 
TotInvestment Total long-term investment 
TotAsset Total assets 
FixAssTotAss Fixed assets over total assets 
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Table 3 Presence of Audit Committees by Ownership Type and Year 
This table reports the prevalence of audit committees in Chinese firms by ownership type and year. 
Year 
Audit 
Committee 
Non-state 
Owned 
state 
Owned All 
2002 No 183 532 715 
 Yes 70 225 295 
2003 No 189 433 622 
 Yes 119 340 459 
2004 No 168 372 540 
 Yes 153 433 586 
All Years No 540 1337 1877 
 Yes 342 998 1340 
Total  882 2335 3217 
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Table 4 Control by Ownership Type and Year 
This table reports the distribution of ultimate control by ownership type and year. 
   
Percentage of firms with 
Ultimate Control 
Year 
Number of Firms in 
Sample 
Percentage of 
Firms With 
Dispersed Control 
Non-state 
Owned 
state 
Owned 
10 percent cut-off for effective control of the largest shareholder 
2002 1010 0.20 24.85 74.95 
2003 1081 0.09 28.40 71.51 
2004 1126 0.09 28.42 71.49 
     
20 percent cut-off for effective control of the largest shareholder 
2002 1010 6.04 23.07 70.89 
2003 1081 5.46 26.18 68.36 
2004 1126 5.33 26.29 68.38 
     
40 percent cut-off for effective control of the largest shareholder 
2002 1010 45.15 8.51 46.34 
2003 1081 46.07 9.16 44.77 
2004 1126 46.09 9.50 44.40 
     
60 percent cut-off for effective control of the largest shareholder 
2002 1010 78.32 2.08 19.60 
2003 1081 78.82 2.50 18.69 
2004 1126 79.04 2.40 18.56 
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Table 5 Basic Statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables by ownership type. 
 Firm Firm years Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std 
Private         
Q 294 882 2.0566 1.4013 1.7398 2.3472 1.0461 
V 294 882 0.3610 0.2643 0.2958 0.4500 0.1542 
C 294 882 0.2111 0.1026 0.1812 0.2699 0.1573 
V_C 294 882 0.1499 0.0519 0.1356 0.2213 0.1224 
VC 294 882 3.2322 1.1896 1.8182 3.1069 5.4957 
Pyramid 294 882 2.4342 2.0000 2.0000 3.0000 0.8607 
Debt 294 882 0.5002 0.3734 0.5065 0.6300 0.1843 
DirS 294 882 0.0177 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.1065 
Big4 294 882 0.0374 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1899 
BordSize 294 882 9.3016 8.0000 9.0000 11.0000 2.0208 
BoardInd 294 882 0.3182 0.2727 0.3333 0.3636 0.0831 
Combine 294 882 0.1474 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3547 
NumBoardMeet 294 882 8.2653 6.0000 8.0000 10.0000 3.3182 
TotAsset 294 882 1.4800 7.0100 1.1000 1.7800 1.3200 
FixAssTotAss 294 882 0.3159 0.1903 0.3011 0.4291 0.1741 
       
Government       
Q 778 2334 1.9276 1.3570 1.6786 2.2071 1.0280 
V 778 2334 0.4719 0.3324 0.4749 0.6039 0.1654 
C 778 2334 0.4259 0.2909 0.4209 0.5760 0.1801 
V_C 778 2334 0.0460 0.0000 0.0000 0.0084 0.0972 
VC 778 2334 1.3426 1.0000 1.0000 1.0236 1.5482 
Pyramid 778 2334 2.3002 2.0000 2.0000 3.0000 0.7100 
Debt 778 2334 0.4605 0.3332 0.4608 0.5916 0.1792 
DirS 778 2334 0.0008 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0078 
Big4 778 2334 0.0510 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2200 
BordSize 778 2334 10.1126 9.0000 9.0000 11.0000 2.3394 
BoardInd 778 2334 0.2984 0.2308 0.3333 0.3333 0.0850 
Combine 778 2334 0.0908 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2874 
NumBoardMeet 778 2334 7.4822 6.0000 7.0000 9.0000 2.9981 
TotAsset 778 2334 2.6400 0.9150 1.5200 2.7600 6.3100 
FixAssTotAss 778 2334 0.3755 0.2183 0.3568 0.5299 0.2019 
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Table 6 Probability of Audit Committee Formation 
This table reports the estimation results of the following logit model. 
( 1| ) ( ) exp( ) /[1 exp( )]P y G= = ≡ +x xβ xβ xβ   
where y = 1 when an audit committee exists and y = 0 otherwise.   
x  ={gov, gov_c, gov_csq, gov_vc, gov_pyramid, gov_debt, gov_dirs, gov_dirssq, C, Csq, VC, Pyramid, Debt, DirS, 
DirSsq, Big4, BordSize, BoardInd, Combine, NumBoardMeet, TotAsset, FixAssToTass, year03, year04} 
Variables Coef. Std. z P>z 
gov -0.0486 0.54 -0.09 0.93 
gov_c 4.1195 2.00 2.06 0.04 
gov_csq -6.1040 2.53 -2.41 0.02 
gov_vc 0.0494 0.04 1.23 0.22 
gov_pyramid -0.1766 0.11 -1.55 0.12 
gov_debt 0.3040 0.48 0.64 0.52 
gov_dirs 1.9060 2.41 0.79 0.43 
C -2.9428 1.52 -1.93 0.05 
Csq 4.6889 2.08 2.25 0.02 
Vc 0.0090 0.02 0.56 0.58 
Pyramid 0.1148 0.09 1.22 0.22 
Debt -0.2039 0.41 -0.49 0.62 
DirS -0.0634 0.66 -0.10 0.92 
Big4 -0.0647 0.18 -0.36 0.72 
BordSize 0.0986 0.02 5.38 0.00 
BoardInd 4.8638 0.59 8.27 0.00 
Combine 0.3033 0.14 2.09 0.04 
NumBoardMeet 0.0481 0.01 3.85 0.00 
TotAsset 0.0088 0.05 0.18 0.86 
FixAssTotAss 0.2789 0.20 1.41 0.16 
year03 0.2243 0.11 2.08 0.04 
year04 0.5824 0.11 5.34 0.00 
Intercept -3.9674 1.08 -3.67 0.00 
Log likelihood -2059.57   Pseudo R2 0.0573 
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Table 7 Marginal Effects and Standard Errors of Logit Model 
This Table reports the post estimation tests of the audit committee formation logit model.  It reports 
the marginal effects and standard errors of the linear explanatory variables.   
2
( ) exp( )( ) [1 exp( )]i ii
G g
x
β β∂ = ≡
∂ +
xβ xβ
xβ
xβ
                  (2) 
x  ={gov, gov_c, gov_csq, gov_vc, gov_pyramid, gov_debt, gov_dirs, gov_dirssq, C, Csq, VC, Pyramid, Debt, DirS, 
DirSsq, Big4, BordSize, BoardInd, Combine, NumBoardMeet, TotAsset, FixAssToTass, year03, year04} 
Marginal effects for the non-state (state) controlling companies are evaluated at the mean of all 
explanatory variables setting gov=0 (gov=1).  Common variables for both state and non-state control 
companies and their marginal effects are evaluated at the mean of all explanatory variables.  Z and 
p>|z| columns report the test statistics and the p-value. Variables prefixed with diff_ report the tests 
on the difference between the marginal effect of the variables for state and non-state controlled 
companies.   
Variables Margina
l Effects 
Std. Err z P>|z| 
Dirs -0.0148 0.15 -0.10 0.92 
Vc 0.0021 0.00 0.56 0.58 
Pyramid 0.0269 0.02 1.22 0.22 
Debt -0.0477 0.10 -0.49 0.62 
     
gov_dirs 0.4497 0.60 0.75 0.46 
gov_vc 0.0142 0.01 1.58 0.11 
gov_pyramid -0.0151 0.02 -0.95 0.34 
gov_debt 0.0245 0.06 0.39 0.69 
     
diff_dirs 0.4497 0.60 0.75 0.46 
diff_vc 0.0142 0.01 1.58 0.11 
diff_pyramid -0.0151 0.02 -0.95 0.34 
diff_debt 0.0245 0.06 0.39 0.69 
     
Big4 -0.0151 0.04 -0.36 0.72 
BordSize 0.0231 0.00 5.38 0.00 
BoardInd 1.1391 0.14 8.27 0.00 
Combine 0.0710 0.03 2.09 0.04 
NumBoardMeet 0.0113 0.00 3.85 0.00 
TotAsset 0.0021 0.01 0.18 0.86 
FixAssTotAss 0.0653 0.05 1.41 0.16 
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Table 8 2SLS Estimation Results for Tobin’s Q 
This table reports the 2SLS Estimation Results for Tobin’s Q. The following specification of the model 
is estimated. 
Q = xβ   
where Q is calculated as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt, divided by book 
value of total assets,   
x  ={gov, gov_c, gov_csq, gov_vc, gov_pyramid, gov_debt, gov_dirs, C, Csq, VC, Pyramid, Debt, DirS, Big4, 
BordSize, BoardInd, Combine, NumBoardMeet, TotInvestment, TotAsset, year03, year04, pri_pd_ac, gov_pd_ac, 
industry_dummy} 
Q Coef. Robust t P>t 
Gov -0.5142 0.2082 -2.47 0.01 
gov_c -1.1733 0.9591 -1.22 0.22 
gov_csq 1.6687 1.2919 1.29 0.20 
gov_vc -0.0261 0.0140 -1.87 0.06 
gov_pyramid 0.2925 0.0698 4.19 0.00 
gov_debt -0.3395 0.2009 -1.69 0.09 
gov_dirs -0.3984 0.4146 -0.96 0.34 
     
C 0.4062 0.7229 0.56 0.57 
Csq -0.3325 1.0404 -0.32 0.75 
VV -0.0030 0.0038 -0.79 0.43 
Pyramid -0.0397 0.0391 -1.02 0.31 
Debt -0.0017 0.1661 -0.01 0.99 
DirS 0.2083 0.1520 1.37 0.17 
     
Big4 0.3670 0.0654 5.61 0.00 
BordSize -0.0146 0.0160 -0.91 0.36 
BoardInd -1.2124 0.9122 -1.33 0.18 
Combine 0.0608 0.0942 0.64 0.52 
TotInvestment -0.0047 0.0036 -1.30 0.19 
TotAsset -0.6158 0.0370 -16.66 0.00 
year03 -0.4468 0.0454 -9.85 0.00 
year04 -0.7175 0.0787 -9.11 0.00 
     
pri_pd_ac 0.9004 0.7481 1.20 0.23 
gov_pd_ac 1.2700 0.6308 2.01 0.04 
     
Intercept 15.7875 0.9540 16.55 0.00 
Industry_dummy Yes    
Adj R-squared 0.365       
Recovered Coefficients    
gov_cons 15.2733 0.9304 16.42 0.00 
gov_vc -0.0291 0.0147 -1.97 0.05 
gov_pyramid 0.2528 0.0450 5.62 0.00 
gov_debt -0.3412 0.1139 -2.99 0.00 
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Figure 1 Agency Cost Function of Controlling Ownership 
Figure 1a –Private Firms 
 
 
Figure 1b –Government Firms 
 
 
Type I Agency Cost 
Type II Agency Cost 
Implementation Cost 
Cash Flow Rights 
Type I Agency Cost Type II Agency Cost 
Implementation Cost 
Cash Flow Rights 
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Figure 2 Marginal Effects of Cash Flow Rights on the Probability of 
Audit Committee Formation  
This figure reports the marginal effects and confidence interval for the cash flow rights on the probability of audit committee formation.   
1,1 1,2 1 1,1 1,2 12
1
( ) exp( )( )( 2 ) ( 2 )[1 exp( )]
G g x x
x
β β β β∂ = + ≡ +
∂ +
xβ xβ
xβ
xβ
          (4) 
Marginal effects for private (goverment) controlled firms are evaluated at the mean of all explanatory variables setting gov=0 (gov=1).  
Different levels of cash flow rights are tested by varying cash flow rights (C) from 5 percent to 100 percent in 5 percent intervals. 
Figure 2a Private Firms 
 
Figure 2b Government Firms 
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Figure 3 Predicted Probability of Audit Committee Formation for 
Private and Government Controlled Firms 
This Figure reports the effects of government control and the level cash flow rights on the predicted probability of audit committee 
formation.  The predicted probability P(AC=1) are calculated using the estimation results reported in Table 6 holding all variables at their 
mean level except for the level of cash flow rights and setting the indicator variable gov=1 (gov=0) and other interactive variables (gov_c, gov_csq, 
gov_vc, gov_pyramid, gov_debt, gov_dirs) accordingly for government (private) controlled firms.  Figure 3a reports the predicted P(AC=1) and 
Figure 3b reports differences in the predicted probability and the 90 percent confidence intervals between private and government controlled 
firms.  
Figure 3a Predicted Probability of Audit Committee Formation for Private and 
Government Controlled Firms 
 
Figure 3b Difference in Predicted Probability of Audit Committee Formation 
between Private and Government Controlled Firms 
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Figure 4 Effect of Government Control and Cash Flow Rights on 
predicted Q when Firms do not Have an Audit Committee 
This figure presents the predicted Q for private and government controlled firms with different levels of cash flow rights.  The predicted Qs 
are calculated using the estimation results reported in Table 8 holding all variables at their mean level, setting the predicted audit committee 
variables (pri_pd_ac gov_pd_ac) equal to zero, and setting the indicator variables gov=1 (gov=0) and other interactive variables (gov_c, gov_csq, 
gov_vc, gov_pyramid, gov_debt, gov_dirs) accordingly for government (private) controlled firms.  Figure 4a reports the predicted Qs while Figure 
4b reports the differences in the predicted Qs and the 90% confidence intervals between private and government controlled firms.   
Figure 4a Predicted Q for Private and Government Controlled Firms 
 
Figure 4b Difference in Predicted Q between Private and Government Controlled 
Firms 
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Figure 5 Effect of Predicted Probability of Audit Committee 
Formation on predicted Q  
This figure presents the predicted Qs for private and government controlled firms with different levels of cash flow rights taking into 
consideration the variations in the predicted audit committee formation.  The predicted Qs are calculated using the estimation results 
reported in Table 8, holding all variables at their mean level except for the level of cash flow rights and predicted probability of audit 
committee formation (pri_pd_ac and gov_pd_ac). The indicator variable is set to be gov=1 (gov=0) and other interactive variables (gov_c, gov_csq, 
gov_vc, gov_pyramid, gov_debt, gov_dirs) are set accordingly for government (private) controlled firms.  Figure 5a reports the predicted Qs and 
Figure 5b reports differences in predicted Qs and the 90 percent confidence intervals between private and government controlled firms.   
Figure 5a Predicted Q for Private and Government Controlled Firms 
 
Figure 5b Difference in Predicted Q between Private and Government Controlled 
Firms 
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